La naturaleza jurídica del derecho de las mujeres a decidir sobre la interrupción voluntaria de su embarazo: aspectos constitucionalesComentarios a la STC (Pleno) 78/2023, de 3 de julio de 2023 (Recurso de amparo 2669-2019)

  1. María Concepción Torres Díaz 1
  1. 1 Universitat d'Alacant

    Universitat d'Alacant

    Alicante, España


Revista Aranzadi Doctrinal

ISSN: 1889-4380

Ano de publicación: 2024

Número: 1

Tipo: Artigo

Outras publicacións en: Revista Aranzadi Doctrinal


The article analyzes the terms in which the Constitutional Court protects a woman appealing for amparo when denouncing the possible violation of fundamental rights such as physical and moral integrity (art. 15 CE), personal and family privacy (art. 18.1 CE), equality and non-discrimination (art. 14 CE), and effective judicial protection (art. 24 CE), stemming from acts of the health administration, as well as from the judiciary itself. The core of the constitutional analysis is circumscribed —from the substantive point of view— in determining the legal nature and scope of the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, and its implications from the point of view of her corporeal and socio-sexual reality. In this context, answering the following question becomes key: what does it mean for women that the Constitutional Court has determined that the right to voluntary termination of pregnancy is a subjective right with constitutional support but of legal configuration? At the formal level, the analysis of the Constitutional Court's decision allows us to delve into the procedural characteristics of a mixed, subsidiary and limited cognition amparo appeal, given the type of resolutions challenged.