Equal-loss solution for monotonic coalitional games

  1. María del Carmen Marco Gil 1
  2. Begoña Subiza Martínez 2
  1. 1 Universidad Pública de Navarra
    info

    Universidad Pública de Navarra

    Pamplona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z0cah89

  2. 2 Universitat d'Alacant
    info

    Universitat d'Alacant

    Alicante, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05t8bcz72

Revista:
Working papers = Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD

Año de publicación: 1997

Número: 6

Páginas: 1-35

Tipo: Documento de Trabajo

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Resumen

A new solution concept to monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility is introduced. This proposal, called the coalitional equal-loss solution, is based on the idea that players withing a coalition should have equal losses from a point of maximum expectations. The proposal generalizes the rational equal-loss solution defined on the subclass of bargaining problems as well as the Shapley value defined on the subclass of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet