Equal-loss solution for monotonic coalitional games
- María del Carmen Marco Gil 1
- Begoña Subiza Martínez 2
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1
Universidad Pública de Navarra
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2
Universitat d'Alacant
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Any de publicació: 1997
Número: 6
Pàgines: 1-35
Tipus: Document de treball
Resum
A new solution concept to monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility is introduced. This proposal, called the coalitional equal-loss solution, is based on the idea that players withing a coalition should have equal losses from a point of maximum expectations. The proposal generalizes the rational equal-loss solution defined on the subclass of bargaining problems as well as the Shapley value defined on the subclass of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility.