Assessing the anticompetitive effect of mergers for market power

  1. FAULI OLLER, RAMON 1
  1. 1 Universitat d'Alacant
    info

    Universitat d'Alacant

    Alicante, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05t8bcz72

Revista:
International Game Theory Review

ISSN: 0219-1989,  1793-6675

Año de publicación: 2002

Volumen: 4

Número: 4

Páginas: 449-458

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1142/S021919890200080X GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: International Game Theory Review

Resumen

In a symmetric setting with constant marginal costs, the welfare loss from mergers depends on the aggregate response of non-participating firms. This response in turn depends on the degree of concavity of the demand. As the degree of concavity of demand is not observable, we obtain conditions that guarantee that the premerger elasticity of demand can be used for antitrust purposes.