Bidding behavior in multi-unit auctionsan experimental investigation and some theoretical insights
- Engelmann, Dirk
- Grimm, Veronika
Argitalpen urtea: 2004
Zenbakia: 12
Mota: Laneko dokumentua
Laburpena
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.