Una revisión de la "teoría triple" de Parfit

  1. Bares Partal, Manuel 1
  1. 1 Universitat d'Alacant
    info

    Universitat d'Alacant

    Alicante, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05t8bcz72

Journal:
Quaderns de filosofia

ISSN: 2341-1414

Year of publication: 2023

Volume: 10

Issue: 1

Pages: 11-30

Type: Article

DOI: 10.7203/QFIA.1.1.25877 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Quaderns de filosofia

Abstract

Abstract: The main topic in On What Matters is, in Parfit’s own words, trying to solve what Henry Sidgwick called “the practical reason´s dualism”. Following Sidgwick, intuitionism and consequentialism are easily compatible related to a reasonable utilitarianism, but both became strongly incompatible with ethic egoism. Parfit, who considers Kant and Sidgwick as his most important influence, believes that it is possible to find a solution through what he calls “The Triple Theory”. Once rejected ethical egoism in his several forms, he thinks that objectivist intuitionism can be compatible with Kantian universalism through Thomas Scanlon consequentialism in his work What We Owe Each Other. The structure and defense of this thesis will make up most of the three volumes of On What Matters. In this essay I will try to argue that, in addition to having to face several classical criticisms, the aim of unifying different ethical theories can leave unanswered important practical questions that where dealt with by the different theories separately.

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