Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

  1. Carmen Herrero 1
  2. Ricardo Martínez 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Alicante, España
  2. 2 Brown University, USA
Revista:
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ISSN: 1863-8279,  1134-5764

Any de publicació: 2008

Volum: 16

Número: 2

Pàgines: 272-283

Tipus: Article

DOI: 10.1007/S11750-008-0043-6 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccés obert editor

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Resum

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems and axiomatically characterize them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal distance rule.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet