Identidad personal y sujeto éticodos modelos alternativos a Derek Parfit

  1. Manuel Bares Partal 1
  1. 1 Universitat d'Alacant
    info

    Universitat d'Alacant

    Alicante, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05t8bcz72

Revista:
Scio

ISSN: 1887-9853

Ano de publicación: 2020

Título do exemplar: Las múltiples caras de la interpretación

Número: 18

Páxinas: 149-175

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.46583/SCIO_2020.18.699 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Outras publicacións en: Scio

Resumo

Personal identity is the main topic in Derek Parfi’s works, and his principal argument for an utilitarian conception of ethics. Ac-cording to his view, we can summarize identity in what he calls R relation, that is, psychological connectivity and continuity. Through his analysis of several mental experiments Parfit arrives to the conclusion that identity is not determined, so it is not what matters. What matters is the R relation, and it is about such a relation, and not about concrete identities, that moral decisions are concerned. Nevertheless, there are different conceptions of identity which are critical with Parfit’s view and which are very far from what Parfit calls “the simple view”. Most of them are critical with utilitarianism. In this essay I’m going to consider Paul Ricoeur’s narrative identity, and Christine Korsgaard’s neokantian view.

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet