Weight Values, Scoring Rules and Abnormally Low Tenders Criteria in Multidimensional ProcurementEffects on Price

  1. Jorge González Chapela 1
  1. 1 Centro Universitario de la Defensa de Zaragoza
Aldizkaria:
Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

ISSN: 0210-1173

Argitalpen urtea: 2019

Zenbakia: 228

Orrialdeak: 55-81

Mota: Artikulua

DOI: 10.7866/HPE-RPE.19.1.3 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openSarbide irekia editor

Beste argitalpen batzuk: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

Laburpena

Many weighing functions are currently in use for evaluating quotes in multidimensional procurement. Although these may affect the price paid by the buyer, their design has been little informed by empirical considerations. This paper studies the impacts of weight values, scoring rules, and abnormally low tenders criteria (ALTC) in an original sample of procurements of services. The panel dimension of the data and the rich set of procurement characteristics are exploited to show that convex price scoring rules (PSRs) and increases in the weight for price yield lower prices, whereas independent/interdependent PSRs and different ALTC result in the same price.

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Finantzaketari buruzko informazioa

Financial support from Centro Universitario de la Defensa de Zaragoza Grant 2017-04 is also gratefully acknowledged

Finantzatzaile

  • Centro Universitario de la Defensa de Zaragoza Spain
    • 2017-04

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