Merger policy in R&D intensive industries

  1. Mª Teresa Pastor-Gosálbez 1
  2. Ramón Faulí-Oller 2
  1. 1 Universidad CEU Cardenal Herrera
    info

    Universidad CEU Cardenal Herrera

    Valencia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01tnh0829

  2. 2 Universitat d'Alacant
    info

    Universitat d'Alacant

    Alicante, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05t8bcz72

Journal:
Revista de economía aplicada

ISSN: 1133-455X

Year of publication: 2016

Volume: 24

Issue: 72

Pages: 47-56

Type: Article

WoS: WOS:000393493500003 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

More publications in: Revista de economía aplicada

Abstract

En este artículo se analiza la política de fusiones óptima en una industria donde las empresas realizan gastos en I+D. Concluimos que la política de fusiones debe ser, en general, menos restrictiva en mercados de alta tecnología (como, por ejemplo, la industria farmacéutica o la de telecomunicaciones), porque las fusiones reducen la duplicación ineficiente de los gastos en I+D. No obstante, la política de fusiones debe ser más estricta en estructuras de mercado muy asimétricas. En este caso, la competencia da incentivos para realizar I+D pero, al mismo tiempo, se evita la duplicación de los gastos.

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Funding information

Fauli-Oller gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and FEDER funds ECO2015-65820-P (MINECO/FEDER), from Generalitat Valenciana grant PROMETEO/2013/037 and the IVIE.

Funders

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