Partial price discrimination by an upstream monopolist

  1. Lluís Bru 1
  2. Ramon Faulí-Oller 2
  3. Joel Sandonís 2
  1. 1 Universitat de les Illes Balears
    info

    Universitat de les Illes Balears

    Palma, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03e10x626

  2. 2 Universitat d'Alacant
    info

    Universitat d'Alacant

    Alicante, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05t8bcz72

Revista:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Año de publicación: 2011

Volumen: 2

Número: 2

Páginas: 217-231

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-010-0030-7 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist to a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of our approach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly. As a consequence, partial price discrimination arises in equilibrium; in particular, we show that inefficient downstream firms receive personalized prices whereas efficient firms are charged a uniform price. The extreme cases of complete price discrimination and uniform price arise in our setting as particular cases, depending on the cost of customizing prices.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet