Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences

1. Mª Carmen Sánchez Antón
2. Josep Enric Peris Ferrando

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In this paper we analyze the relationship between acyclic social decision functions and fixed agenda social choice correspondences which verify some rationality conditions (such as Pareto, independence, monotonicity or neutrality). This enables us to translate known sesults of monotonicity or neutrality). This enables us to translate known sesults of existence of individuals with veto from the social decision functions context into the fixed agenda framework, such as those of Blau and Deb (1977), Blair and Pollak (1982)

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