Competition for procurement shares
- Alcalde Pérez, José
- Dahm, Matthias
ISSN: 1988-8767
Año de publicación: 2011
Número: 642
Tipo: Documento de Trabajo
Otras publicaciones en: Notas técnicas: [continuación de Documentos de Trabajo FUNCAS]
Resumen
We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payo s are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which armative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing armative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.