Información estratégica en la negociación colectiva: evidencia empírica para el mercado continuo español

  1. Sabater Marcos, Ana M.
  2. Laffarga Briones, Joaquina
  3. Rubia Serrano, Antonio
Revista:
Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

ISSN: 0210-2412

Ano de publicación: 2008

Número: 138

Páxinas: 315-352

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2008.10779647 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openIdus editor

Outras publicacións en: Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

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