Los deberes positivos generales y el concepto de "causa"
ISSN: 0214-8676, 2386-4702
Year of publication: 2007
Issue: 30
Pages: 105-110
Type: Article
More publications in: Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho
Abstract
This paper shows the complexity underlying the apparently simple argument used by Ernesto Garzón in order to justify general positive duties. This argument is based on the idea that the existence of a duty is justified because the opposite course of action causes harm. It is shown that this type of argument can be interpreted in different ways, and that all of these raise problems: If we take an adscriptive concept of cause, that is, a concept that uses normative criteria in order to impute the status of cause, then the argument becomes circular. In contrast, if we use factic regularity as a criterion of attribution, the argument defeats itself. The alternative is to lower the requirement from a causal connection to causal effectiveness; then, however we only have half of the argument: The other half requires complex reasoning of an essentialy normative nature. The authors reach the conclusion that in order to justify the existence of general positive duties the open discussion of norms, principles and values is required, as is the case with general negative duties.