Racionalidad limitada

  1. Ballester Pla, Coralio
  2. Hernández Rojas, Penélope
Revista:
Revista internacional de sociología

ISSN: 0034-9712

Año de publicación: 2012

Volumen: 70

Número: 1

Páginas: 27-38

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.3989/RIS.2011.10.20 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Revista internacional de sociología

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Referencias bibliográficas

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  • Ballester, C., A. Calvó-Armengol and Y. Zenou. 2006. “Who is Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player.” Econometrica 75:1403-1418.
  • Benito, J., P. Brañas-Garza, P. Hernández, and J. Sanchis. 2010. “Strategic behavior in Schelling dynamics: A new result and experimental evidence.” Working Paper 14-2010. Economic Science Institute, chapman ca.
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